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Abstract 
Equitable sharing of fishing resources has been the major source of tension between 
Zambezi Valley communities and the Zimbabwe government authorities since the 
1950s following the Kariba Dam-induced resettlement. Using participatory action 
research, it was found that the fishing license system and criminalization of 
fishermen were the major sources of tension between fishermen and government 
authorities. Engaging with government authorities to address these tensions, 
fishermen were recognized as partners in the fishing industry. The conclusion was 
that enhancing community agencies through participatory action research would be 
fundamental towards creating socially just and equitable arrangements that could 
emancipate marginalized communities from abject poverty. 
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This paper examines the extent to which marginalized fishermen along the Kariba Dam 
used participatory action research to demand increased access and benefit-sharing of fishing 
resources from government authorities. Over the past five decades, the mid-Zambezi Valley 
communities, mainly the Tonga minority ethnic group residing on the Zimbabwean side of the 
Zambezi River, have experienced a sustained conflict between authorities to regain entitlement to 
fishing resources. Yet, fishing continues to be an inherent, if not an indispensable, aspect of the 
lives of the Zambezi Valley people, both on the Zambian and Zimbabwean side of the mid-
Zambezi River. On the Zimbabwean side, these communities are spread across the Binga, Hwange, 
Nyaminyami and Gokwe districts in the north-western part of Zimbabwe (Figure 1).      
The Tonga lost entitlement to fishing following their ‘forced uprooting’ (Colson, 2003) 
due to the inundation of their homes in 1957-8 by the Kariba Dam (Colson, 1971). However, it 
was not until late 2007 that the debate on access and benefit sharing of fish resources gained 
momentum. The origins of motivation for the Tonga to provoke the debate could be attributed to 
what McGregor (2009) terms ‘politics of recognition’ to address their marginalization. Further, 
Conyers and Cumanzala (2004) assert that the combination of the Tonga’s perceived identity, 
minority ethnic status, unique history and lack of basic infrastructure and services encouraged 
them to strive to demystify the media portrayal of them while at the same time improving their 
social and economic status.  
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Figure 1: Location of the Zambezi Valley, Source: Authors. 
 
Since the Kariba Dam-induced resettlement in 1957-8, fishing has been considered a risky 
business, not only from crocodiles and hippos but also from state authorities. The fishermen have 
been risking their lives and surviving at the end of the margins due to the conflict between them 
and state institutions: the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (National 
Parks); Zimbabwe Republic Police (Police); and the Binga, Hwange and Nyaminyami Rural 
District Councils (Councils). Previous studies of the conflict between state authorities and kapenta 
(Limnothrissa miodon) fishermen on one hand and gillnet fishermen on the other have tended to 
explore the dispute as distinct industries warranting different approaches (McGregor, 2009; 
Nyikahadzoi, 2009; Nyikahadzoi and Raakjaer, 2009). This allowed for an in-depth understanding 
of the nature and dynamics of each of the industries. The downside of studying kapenta and gillnet 
fishing as separate entities could be its failure to reveal a holistic view of the challenges the Kariba 
Dam fishing industry faces. This paper addresses this gap by examining the struggle of kapenta 
and gillnet fishermen in developing transformative actions to improve access and benefit-sharing 
arrangements of fishing resources in the Kariba Dam district. This paper will not only contribute 
to the access and benefit-sharing literature on fishing resources, but will also resonate with the 
marginalized people’s struggles towards socially accessing and benefit-sharing of resources that 
address poverty.   
This paper examines contextualizing the conflict within the marginalization conceptual 
framework. Limited access to fishing resources tends to be largely underpinned by the 
marginalization of communities displaced by the Lake Kariba construction in the 1950s. It then 
moves to outline the participatory action research methodology that was employed as a means of 
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empowering fishermen to seek increased access and fair benefit-sharing arrangements for fishing 
resources. The paper then presents and discusses two major sources of tensions, namely, the fishing 
license system and the harassment of fishermen. And finally, the paper discusses results of the 
actions taken by fishermen in addressing the access and benefit-sharing imbalances. The 
conclusion is that enhancing of community agencies through participatory action research is 
fundamental towards creating socially just access and benefit-sharing arrangements that can 
emancipate marginalized communities from abject poverty.   
 
Conceptualizing Marginalization 
This study used a marginalization framework to contextualize the conflict between the 
fishermen and the state in accessing and sharing fishing resources in the Zambezi Valley. Yet, 
marginalization, like most social science concepts, is a contested concept. Hall et al. (1994) define 
marginalization as the peripheralisation of individuals and groups from a dominant, central 
majority. They view marginalization as a socio-political process, producing both vulnerabilities 
(risks) and strengths (resilience) as summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  
Properties of Marginalization 
Property  Description 
Intermediacy Having boundaries that separate and protect, such as the skin, but also referring to risk of 
personal or territorial invasion and the dangers inherent in living in contested or border 
environments. 
Differentiation The strength of cultural and personal uniqueness and the risk of becoming a scapegoat and 
being stigmatized. 
Power Access to resources, individual and collective awareness and organization, and risks 
associated with enforced conformity. 
Secrecy Access to, and control of information to protect one’s self and group, and the risks resulting 
from the dominating group’s use of insider knowledge to their advantage. 
Reflectiveness Survival skills gained from leading an examined life, and the risks involved in the 
exhaustive processes of constant vigilance, and analysis of each new social encounter 
necessary for safety. 
Voice Expression of one’s experiences as valid and different from the dominant myths, and the 
risks of being silenced. 
Liminality Having experiences not shared by others; severe trauma, stigmatization, and illnesses can 
foster abilities to empathize with others, but carry risks of alienation, altered perceptions, 
and heavy psychic strain. 
Note: Adapted from Hall, et al (1994) 
  
Burman and McKay (2007, p. 317) define marginalization as ‘the process by which persons 
are peripheralized, or pushed to the periphery to varying degrees from the socio-political center, 
because of their identities, associations, experiences, or environments.’ They further contend that 
marginalized persons are viewed as relatively different from the norm, and marginalization can 
involve gender, racial, political, cultural and economic oppression. According to Still (2001), 
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marginalization involves a relative lack of power and influence. Thus, marginalization is most 
often used to illustrate differences, hierarchies and dependent relationships between regions, 
sectors, groups and individuals. It illustrates the scarcity of human or physical endowments, or 
both, as well as a lack of political or economic competitiveness between social groups or 
geographical areas. Marginalized regions, sectors, groups and individuals ‘lack something.’ They 
may lack such things as power, education, access to resources, capital, and democratic institutions. 
Conflicts arise between the center and the periphery when the marginalized group attempts to 
remove or reduce the ‘lacking something.’ 
Table 1 reveals that marginalized people have less power and influence than the dominant 
social group. For example, marginalized people often live in contested environments, their access 
to resources has to contend with enforced conformity, and they have limited access to information. 
Marginalized people fit Foucault’s description that they are most prone to be incarcerated or 
otherwise punished. 
Although the origins of the marginalization discourse are mostly associated with feminist 
theories (Hooks, 1984; Hall et al., 1992; Stevens, 1993), it has gradually found expression in other 
social science disciplines such as nursing and developmental studies. The properties of 
marginalization in Table 1 resonate with critical theories; thus, marginalization is inclusive of 
oppression, and also a consequence of oppression (Hall, et al., 1999). Thus, the concept of 
marginalization can be useful in illuminating the subjective experience of the Zambezi Valley 
fishermen, including how they interpret the power-equation, the language, and their desires 
towards equitable access and the sharing of fishing resources. To this end, this paper adopts the 
constructionist epistemology through participation towards equitable access and sharing of Lake 
Kariba’s fishing resources. Constructionism is an ontological condition of social being, social 
consciousness, social action, institutions, structures, even society itself; it is not a form imposed 
on social life, but social life and human lives are themselves socially constructed (Somers, 1992). 
If marginalization can be understood through social construction, social action is also guided by 
construction, thus social processes and interactions, both institutional and interpersonal, are 
mediated through social construction.  
 
Marginalization of the Kariba Dam Fishermen: Evidence from the Literature 
The marginalization of the Zambezi Valley fishermen cannot be understood in isolation of 
the broader peripheralisation or exclusion of the Tonga. As a way of simplifying our understanding 
the marginalization of the Tonga, we briefly explore the events using Mhlanga’s (2009) three 
phases: the pre-impoundment phase (before 1958), the post-impoundment colonial phase (1958-
1980) and post-impoundment independence phase. Life during the pre-impoundment phase for the 
Zambezi River Tonga can be traced from the Iron Age, half a million ages ago (Reynolds and 
Cousins, 1991), and was primarily based around riverbank farming, fishing and hunting. Known 
in various terms as ‘basimulonga’ (Colson, 1971) ‘basilwizi’ (Tremmel, 1994), and ‘bamudonga’ 
(Ncube 2004), the Tonga’s crop cultivation was based on recession agriculture, which depended 
on the flood regimen of the river. Fishing, kuzuba nswi, was one of the major sources of livelihood 
International Journal of African Development v.3 n.2 Spring 2016  9 
 
for the Zambezi Valley Tonga. Agriculture was combined with fishing, where for instance, bream 
and tiger fish were caught with nets and buckets in small inlets when the flood receded from the 
Zambezi River and its tributaries, (Weinrech, 1977) without any restrictions. They supplemented 
their diet with fish, a source of protein required by the body for growth and maintenance of tissue. 
The beginning of the post-impoundment phase began with the loss of entitlement to fishing 
resources which came to an abrupt end between 1956 and 1958 following the forcible uprooting 
or removal of the Tonga whose homes and lands were flooded by the building of the Kariba Dam. 
Approximately 57,000 people were ‘moved’ by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to areas 
outside the reservoir on both sides of the Zambezi River in what today is known as Zambia and 
Zimbabwe (Colson, 1971). With a capacity of 180.6 km3, surface area of 5577 km2 and length of 
280 km, the Kariba Dam was then the largest man-made lake in the world (WCD, 2000). The lake 
was primarily constructed to generate hydro-electricity.  
On the Zimbabwean side, 22 chiefdoms were forcibly moved to make way for the dam, 
including Simunchembu, Sinamagonde and Musambakaruma chiefdoms that were relocated to 
areas far from the river, where there was inadequate water (WCD, 2000).  The Tonga have become 
what can be termed ‘development refugees’ (Weist, 1995) or development-induced internally 
displaced persons who still need to be rehabilitated. With more than five decades since the Kariba 
Dam construction, the great dam, which deprived the Tonga of their homes, has not benefited them 
(Lessing, 1993; Tremmel, 1994). In addition to loss of agricultural lands, clean drinking water and 
hunting, access to fishing was one of the major sources of livelihood the Tonga people lost. Since 
the construction of the Kariba Dam, the marginalization of the fishermen continued to grow. To 
appreciate the extent of marginalization of the Zimbabwean fishermen by the successive 
governments, Table 2 compares the Zambian and Zimbabwean fishermen since the resettlement 
in the 1950s. Hall et al.’s (1994) five of seven properties of marginalization - intermediacy, 
differentiation, power, secrecy and voice - were considered sufficient to reveal the extent of 
injustices suffered by the Zimbabwean fishermen. 
On the Zambian side, the interest of the local population was paramount. There was no 
racially based segmentation. The whole Zambian shoreline was designated as “Native Trust Land” 
and could not be utilized without consent of the local people. In contrast, in Zimbabwe, the then 
Rhodesian authorities divided the shorelines along racial lines into 14 areas, which later changed 
to eight and then to the present seven in 1972 and 1976 respectively. The native areas were shared 
with white-owned concessionaires who, in addition to their own fishing concession areas, would 
also purchase the fish from the black fishermen (Karenge and Games, 1995). Also, any kind of 
economic investment in onshore fishing in Zimbabwe had been virtually absent (Marshall, et al., 
1982; Bourdillon, et al., 1985; Kolding et al., 2003), in contrast to a relatively strong management 
regime and enforcement capacity which had not changed since Zimbabwe’s independence from 
Britain in 1980. In the 1990s, the National Parks devolved appropriate authority status to the Binga 
and Nyaminyami RDCs where the RDCs subleased the Exclusive Fishing Zones (EFZ) to 
fishermen and created a co-management structure. To this end, the National Parks created a  
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Table 2:  
Comparison between Zambia and Zimbabwean Fishermen Marginalization 
Property of 
marginalization 
Zambia Zimbabwe 
Before independence After independence 
Intermediacy Shoreline not divided 
into fishing zones with 
fishermen having 
freedom of choice of 
where to fish 
Lake designated Kariba 
Recreational Park; 
Shoreline divided into 
14 zones, reduced to 8 
and then 7 zones in 1972 
and 1976 respectively. 
No freedom of choice of 
movement on where to 
fish 
Lake designated Kariba 
Recreational Park and 7 fishing 
zones have remained unchanged; 
No freedom of choice of movement 
on where to fish 
Differentiation Shoreline not divided 
according to race, color, 
etc.  
Shoreline divided along 
racial lines with ‘native’ 
reserves and concessions 
for whites. White-owned 
companies dominate 
both kapenta and 
inshore/artisanal 
commercial fishing. 
No discrimination on shoreline but 
is opened to wider community with 
no preference to the resettled 
people. White-owned companies 
continue to dominate both kapenta 
and inshore/artisanal commercial 
fishing. 
Power Access to fishing 
generally unregulated; 
no limits on net sizes 
Access to fishing 
regulated by Department 
of National Parks such 
as net sizes, number of 
nets to prevent 
overfishing, and 
settlements prohibited. 
Offenders are punished; 
survival of the fittest; 
low income 
Conservationist and tourist 
interests grew stronger than pre-
independence. Access to fishing 
regulated by Department of 
National Parks such as net sizes, 
number of nets and settlements 
prohibited. Offenders are punished; 
survival of the fittest; low income 
Secrecy Information was 
available to fishermen; 
capacity building for 
fishermen, e.g. Fishery 
Training Centre at 
Sinazongwe in 1961 
Information restricted to 
officials and not 
available to fishermen; 
no capacity building for 
fishermen; fishermen 
avoid punishment 
Cooperatives created and capacity 
building related to conformity to 
regulations rather than rights of 
fishermen  
Voice Fishermen have freedom 
to express themselves 
No freedom to express 
their exteriorized life of 
survival or hope for the 
future 
Freedom to express their 
exteriorized life of survival or hope 
for the future is determined by 
political affiliation 
Note: Source: Authors 
 
hierarchical Sub-Area Fishermen Association structure to co-manage each of the eight EFZs. 
However, Sub-Area Fishermen Associations were ineffective because of the flawed nature of their 
creation; they were created for the wrong and mundane reasons. The Sub-Area Fishermen 
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Associations were established to provide such things as keeping statistics and monitoring poachers 
because the state could not sustain the regulatory operations due to inadequate resources. Thus, 
the Sub-Area Fishermen Associations were meant to serve and also ensure their conformity to the 
regulatory infrastructure that marginalized the fishermen in the first place. McGregor (2009) 
argues that the co-management structure of Sub-Area Fishermen Associations had little impact on 
fishermen’s access to resources due to, among others, limited participation of fishermen in the 
delimitation of the Exclusive Fishing Zones (EFZ) and the persistence of criminalization of 
fishermen. 
In contrast in Zambia, there is freedom of fishing and fishermen can fish anywhere. The 
Zambian inshore fishing, with virtually no enforcement of regulations, experienced a much higher 
fishing intensity and a changed fishing pattern towards increasingly smaller mesh sizes resulting 
in a higher exploitation level (Kolding et al., 2003).  From Zambia’s independence in 1964 to 
1986, no mesh restrictions for gillnets existed and beach seines were allowed. After 1986, the 
minimum mesh size for gillnets was set at three inches (76 mm), beach seining and kutumpula 
(fish driving) were prohibited. In practice, however, there was little enforcement due to a lack of 
resources (Musando, 1996 as cited by Kolding, 2003). Notwithstanding, the overall fishing effort, 
in terms of number of nets, was about seven times higher in Zambia than in Zimbabwe, there were 
no indications of biological overexploitation in the Zambian inshore fishing in terms of reduced 
total yields or changed fishing communities. Thus, the assumption that there was over-fishing in 
Lake Kariba was a myth as inshore fishing stocks are only moderately exploited and severely 
underutilized in Zimbabwe. Besides, the water has power to restock fish even under intensive 
exploitation as Lake Kariba is a naturally fluctuating and resilient system with its source of 
biomass and productivity being located in the hydrological regime, and annual pulse of fertilizing 
nutrients washed in by the rains (Kolding et al., 2003). 
Kolding, et al. (2003) list a litany of restrictions, which exclude and criminalize the 
Zimbabwean fishermen, which include the following: 
 Fishing is not permitted using nets with less than a four-inch (102 mm stretched) mesh size.  
 Explosives, chemicals, poisons, intoxicating substances, scoop nets, jigging and fish 
driving may not be used to catch fish.  
 Fishing is not permitted along parts of the shoreline belonging to the DNPWM, notably all 
the Chete Safari Area, most of the Matusadona National Park, and parts of the Charara Safari Area. 
Other restrictions are in place for mouths of rivers, large population centers, harbors, and river 
estuaries. 
 Fish net manufacturing is not permitted for persons who do not hold a valid manufacturer 
and dealer license, and fishing nets can only be sold to holders of valid fishing permits. 
 
Approach to Collecting Field Evidence 
The extent to which the Zambezi Valley fishermen were marginalized and excluded from 
fair access and equitable sharing of benefits of fishing resources required a methodology that was 
grounded in social transformation and human rights activism. Participatory action research was 
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considered appropriate as it lends itself to be associated with social change, where its results can 
be translated into political action (Sarantakos, 2006; Gibson, 2004). 
Mainly accredited to Kurt Lewin’s action research in the 1940s in USA, participatory 
action research has been associated with the critical theory and philosophy of liberation where 
research is grounded in people’s struggles (Kindon et al., 2007). Paulo Freire’s work in Brazil, 
Mahatma Ghandi’s work in India, and Julius Nyerere’s work in Tanzania are among the most cited 
examples of the effectiveness of participatory action research, and how it can empower the 
oppressed to transform society and assert their rights (Savin-Baden and Wimpenny, 2007). In 
participatory action research, Reason and Bradbury (2001) stated that researchers and participants 
work together to construct knowledge from their experiences and realities where a single 
phenomenon can have multiple interpretations. They further stated that researchers and 
participants identify the problem and formulate actions together to change the situation for the 
better. In many ways, participatory action research is in sharp contrast with the positivist 
epistemologies of knowledge construction where knowledge is seen as a free-standing unit 
independent of the researcher (McNoff and Whitehead, 2002). Notwithstanding the argument that 
participatory action research can lead to social change, participatory action research can be 
difficult to organize as it requires financial, material and human resources as well as time. 
Participatory action research for this project was supported by the advocacy cycle tool (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Advocacy Cycle 
 
The kapenta and gillnet fishermen who participated in this project were from the Binga, 
Hwange and Nyaminyami district fishing cooperatives. Although the researchers and fishermen 
used the advocacy cycle as a guide, discussions on problem identification and analysis, setting 
objectives, and identifying stakeholders were messy, emotional, and full of contestation (Cahil, 
2007), swinging back and forth from time to time. Nonetheless, as soon as stakeholders were 
identified, they were engaged in the participatory action research project, where the problem, 
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objectives, stakeholders and resources were reviewed. This was important to ensure commitment 
of participants to ‘actioning’ the findings. The stakeholders were drawn from the National Parks, 
Rural District Councils, Traditional Chiefs and non-governmental organizations, Basilwizi Trust, 
and Save the Children. Involving government structures was important and did not only provide 
legitimacy and ownership of the findings, but also reduced suspicion from politicians since the 
project was implemented in 2007 and 2010 at the height of political tensions in Zimbabwe.  
The second aspect involved capacity building of fishermen and stakeholders. This was at 
two levels. Firstly, fishermen were trained on advocacy skills as a way of empowering them to 
demand access and control to fishing resources. This included social problem analysis, research, 
conflict resolution, negotiating strategies and lobbying. As a result of the training, the fishermen 
formed the Kujatana Kwesu Fisheries Union comprised of nine executive committee members, 
including one female. The Kujatana Kwesu Fisheries Union enabled fishermen to present and 
represent themselves in demanding increased access and benefits to fishing resources as well as 
issues around conservation. Secondly, awareness workshops were facilitated by officials from the 
National Parks and Rural District Councils. This included a review of the Parks and Wildlife Act 
and related instruments and guidelines. The research team played a facilitatory role, mainly in 
providing technical and logistical support. Following the training, fishermen and stakeholders 
developed an action plan which included gathering evidence on the extent of marginalization of 
fishermen, meetings, seminars and conferences with duty-bearers in government authorities. The 
Zambezi Valley stakeholders’ conference that was held in Harare from 1-3 December 2010 was 
one of a series of dialogue meetings between fishermen and government authorities. At the Harare 
conference, high-level decision-makers, involving three government ministers including the 
Minister of Natural Resources, participated in the discussions. 
 
Field Evidence of Fishermen’s Marginalization 
This section presents the problems fishermen were facing which limited their access and 
control of fishing resources. The problems were mainly in two categories, namely, the fishing 
license system, and criminalization and punishment of fishermen. 
 
Fishing License System 
To regulate fishing activities, a fishing license system, managed by the National Parks, was 
put in place for both Kapenta and gillnet fishermen. Kapenta and gillnet fishermen, both 
individuals and co-operatives, applied for licenses to both the National Parks and Rural District 
Councils. The National Parks is the licensing agency for permits to use water resources in Lake 
Kariba, and the Rural District Councils issue fishing permits for fishing zones located in their 
jurisdictions. Both gillnet and kapenta fishermen were aware of the National Parks’ eligibility 
requirements for them to be allowed to fish.  
For me or a cooperative to obtain a [gillnet fishing] license, I need to convince authorities 
[Rural District Council] that I own a boat and life jackets. I have also to identify the fishing 
camp I will be operating from. 
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Similarly, to register for kapenta fishing, fishermen need to provide evidence of ownership 
of a fishing rig (boat), life jackets and operational area. There were additional requirements for 
both gillnet and kapenta fishing cooperatives to be eligible to fish. A certificate of registration, 
constitution and membership list were needed by the licensing authorities. For gillnet fishermen, 
the National Parks issues the fishing licenses to three riparian Rural District Councils - Binga, 
Nyaminyami and Hwange.  
There is a small difference between the Nyaminyami and Binga Rural District Councils’ 
allocation of licenses considering that they have a large shoreline compared with the Hwange Rural 
District Council which has one fishing camp at Musuna. The Rural District Councils then issue 
the fishing licenses to the individual fisherman or fishing cooperative. The distribution of licenses 
per individual fisherman can differ according to the Rural District Councils. Forty-six percent of 
licenses are issued to cooperatives. Fishing licenses or permits for gillnet fishermen operation on 
state lands are issued directly by the National Parks. Applications for kapenta fishing were made 
at the National Parks District Office in Binga for onward processing in Harare. Table 4 shows the 
distribution of kapenta fishing permits in the three riparian districts of Binga, Hwange and 
Nyaminyami.  
That the National Parks’ licensing system lacked accountability and transparency was a 
concern for both kapenta and gillnet fishermen. They claimed there was a shortfall in the number 
of fishing licenses that were issued in Harare, and those distributed by the National Parks Sub-
office in Binga. In any case, the official license limit had never been reviewed and the actual 
recorded number of nets and fishermen, although fluctuating most of the time, had been below the 
values. Fishermen also expressed concern over additional license fees they were charged by 
authorities. For example, in Deka in the Hwange Rural District Council, the National Parks 
required the gillnet fishermen to pay daily fees for fishing, yet they would have already paid for 
fishing licenses at the Rural District Council.  
We’re not benefiting much from fishing. The National Parks charged us daily fees when 
we would have paid for a license to the Rural District Council.  
 
In the Malala Fishing Camp in the Binga Rural District Council, the gillnet fisherfolk had 
raised concerns over the renewal of licenses which changed from annual, to six months and then 
to monthly. They were required to renew their licences monthly, and this was burdening them 
financially to the extent that it was unmanageable.  
They [authorities] are insensitive. How can they charge us on a monthly basis? Where do 
they think we can get the money, when at the same time they restrict us to fish as much as 
we would? At the end, we’re only working for the authorities instead of feeding our 
families.  
 
In the Nyaminyami District, the gillnet fisherfolk have complained over the number of 
permits they were supposed to apply for.  
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We’re being ripped off by the three-in-one payment system. We pay for three permits to 
sell the same fish. First, we apply for a permit to fish, another one to sell [fish] [to traders] 
at the [fishing] camps, and then the third one is a hawker’s license that enables us to sell 
the fish outside the fishing camp. Our colleagues in kapenta fishing only require one permit 
to fish and sell the kapenta.  
 
The fishermen, through the Kujatana Kwesu Fisheries Union as Section 6 illustrates, have 
continued to engage with government authorities to address the problems in the fishing license 
system. This is despite the participatory action research project that ended in 2010.  
 
Criminalization and Punishment of Fishermen 
The accounts by the fishermen about criminalization and punishment were not new; they 
were consistent with the literature (McGregor, 2009; Nyikahadzoi, 2009). What was new was the 
degree of abuse of fishermen by the National Parks officials. One gillnetter had this to say: 
When the National Parks officials impound our nets, they don’t return them to us even after 
paying the fines. They sell them to Zambian fishermen or fishermen at our neighboring 
camps. When they arrest us – they loot; they take everything. The National Parks officials 
share the fish so they can feed their families. We remain here with nothing. 
 
During one of the meetings which involved fishermen, the National Parks, Rural District 
Councils, Lake Navigation, Police, and the Ministry of Youth, Empowerment and Development, 
fishermen highlighted alleged corrupt activities taking place within the National Parks, especially 
in passing information to Zambian fishing boats over their patrol schedules and raiding times. The 
fishermen also lamented at the fines that were too low to deter any illegal fishing activities by the 
Zambian fishermen. They recommended stiffer penalties for illegal Zambian fishermen such as 
heavy fines and confiscation of their boats. 
The National Parks officials come here to us without any reason. They don’t explain what 
they want. One day they came here [fishing camp name supplied] and started firing bullets 
in the air, searched our huts and forced us to roll on the ground and stand on our heads. 
One official asked my wife ‘why are you not pregnant?’ Then they started accusing us of 
hosting Zambian poachers. But, we never host any [Zambian] poachers; instead the 
National Parks are letting the Zambians fish on our side without repercussions. With bribes 
from the Zambians, the National Parks officials give them [Zambian fish poachers] their 
patrolling timetable so they don’t clash with them. 
 
The following shows that fishermen were aware of the need to conserve fishing resources, 
and their participation would contribute to the management and sustainability of the resources. 
Also, the National Parks were allegedly working with white concessionaires to harass the 
fishermen. 
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National Parks officials also work together with white concessionaires to harass us. For 
example, there is an arrogant agent of a wildlife safari operator [name supplied] who gets 
into the Lake [Kariba] and starts pulling our nets and beating us up if he finds us in areas 
he claims to be prohibited [from fishing]. But fishing has nothing to do with him … his job 
about hunting wild animals. 
 
This was contrary to Nyikahadzoi and Songore’s (1999) study whose findings show that 
about 89 percent of the fishermen indicated that the relationship between them and law 
enforcement agents was either ‘friendly’ or ‘very friendly.’ A further study could be quite 
revealing as to the reasons for the change. However, the lawlessness and socio-economic decline 
which characterised Zimbabwe during the 2000s could have contributed to the change of relations 
between fishermen and law enforcement agents.  
Police were also a problem. Sometimes, they forced us to lower fish prices. It’s very unfair. 
We are not free at all in this country. Rural District Councils lack transparency on tariffs. 
They don’t give enough days to lodge our objections to the tariffs.  For example, our Rural 
District Council [name supplied] gave us three days to object to the rates they were 
proposing instead of 30 days [stipulated by the law]. 
 
Gillnet and kapenta fishermen caught breaking the rules remained subject to draconian 
punishment, which ranged from confiscation of boats and nets (McGregor, 2009) to physical abuse 
by the National Park officials.  
 
Implementing Research Findings 
A participatory action research which does not result in action can be, arguably, regarded 
as a failure. On the basis of the problems fishermen identified through the participatory action 
research, an action plan was drawn to engage authorities. The results of the engagement were a 
testimony of the power of action research as a tool for social change. There are at least four 
indicators of the impact of the project processes and outcomes. They include improved 
organization of fishermen, influencing the fishing license system, and protecting the rights of 
fishermen. 
Firstly, as already outlined in earlier sections of this paper, the devolution of appropriate 
authority to the Binga and Nyaminyami Rural District Councils, created through section 95(1) of 
the National Parks Act of 1991 and Statutory Instruments 12/91 and 40/94, led to the establishment 
of the Sub-Area Fishermen Association. To some extent, the devolution created an ‘invited space’ 
for the fishermen to participate in fishery management. Fishermen were able to at least attend 
meetings where they were invited, and receive travel allowances and other perks as a reward of 
their participation (McGregor, 2009). However, at the time this study was conducted, the Sub-
Area Fishermen Association only existed in theory as there were barely any activities in practice. 
Nonetheless, the space provided by the Sub-Area Fishermen Association still exists today and can 
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be used by fishermen at the invitation of government authorities, mainly to fulfil government 
agendas.  
However, by creating the Kujatana Kwesu Fisheries Cooperative Union, the fishermen 
invented an additional space to be heard by government authorities. Fishermen had become more 
organized by presenting and representing themselves in the management of fishing resources. They 
were able to organize their own meetings where they invited government authorities such as the 
National Parks and Rural District Councils. Also, government authorities had recognized 
fishermen as a body. In the Binga Rural District Council, fishermen became a recognized body in 
council meetings, particularly meetings where fishing licenses and permit fees were discussed. 
Fishermen had also become more organized in resource mobilization. For example, they had 
managed to construct a fish warehouse that was funded by the British Embassy in Zimbabwe. The 
warehouse was commissioned by the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources on 7 March 
2013.   
Secondly, using advocacy skills obtained from the participatory action research, since 
2009, fishermen have been challenging the fishing license and permit system through the Kujatana 
Kwesu Fisheries Union. On 7 March 2013, the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources 
acknowledged engagement with fishermen on the fishing license system.  
I have received reports from the fishermen that our policies and legislation are either in 
competition or in duplication which has confused and inconvenienced our people by having 
a multi-level licensing system … This arrangement has been acknowledged as an anomaly 
by my ministry, and we have agreed to explore ways of addressing it so that fishermen are 
not overburdened. (Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, 7 March 2013) 
 
Also, in 2009, fishermen successfully negotiated with the National Parks to have the 
kapenta permit fees reduced from US $500 to US $250 per rig per quarter. Similarly, the Binga 
RDC reduced the quarterly permit fees for gillnets from US $50 to US $30. Likewise, the quarterly 
permit fees for gillnets in the Nyaminyami District were reduced from US $50 to US $40. The 
reduction in permit fees means that the fisherman’s income increased, which would enable them 
to improve the welfare of their families.  Thirdly, the criminalization and punishment of fishermen 
remain top on the fishermen’s agenda. They have engaged with government officials from local to 
national levels. Some efforts at the local level are supported by the following quote:  
We invited the National Parks officials, the District Administrator, representatives of the 
Binga RDC and Zimbabwe Republic Police to ‘talk with them’ about the issue of 
harassment and abuse of fishermen and their wives by the National Parks officials. The 
[National Parks] officer who was perpetrating violence was present, but they hid him for 
they feared we were going to assault him. The National Parks Area Manager apologized to 
us on behalf of errant staff members. Since then we haven’t experienced any harassment. 
(Member of Kujatana Kwesu Fisheries Union, name withheld) 
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As a result of the fishermen’s advocacy, the Minister of Environment and Natural 
Resources was also looking for ways to reduce the harassment of fishermen by law enforcement 
agents from the National Parks and the police.  
Law enforcement is one of the key result areas of my ministry. While my ministry 
continues to perform well on this front, despite resource constraints, of greater concern are 
the alleged harassment, mistreatment and abuse of fishermen by our law enforcement 
agents along the lake. We are aware of this disturbing trend and my directors have been 
sent out to the communities on a fact finding mission. (Minister of Environment and 
Natural Resources, 7 March 2013) 
 
As a result of these advocacy efforts by fishermen, meetings involving fishermen, police, 
the National Parks, rural district councils, and the Ministry of the Local Government resulted in 
the reorganization of the National Parks Binga Office. It was reported that one of its officials was 
charged for misconduct linked to the harassment of the fishermen. It was also reported that the 
National Parks officials had since undergone some training in working with fishermen.  
 
Reflecting on Both the Process and Product of Participatory Action Research 
This paper has outlined the extent to which fishermen along the Kariba Dam used 
participatory action research to organize themselves to tilt access and benefit sharing arrangements 
towards a socially just system. To ensure that participatory action research becomes a means 
towards social change rather an end in itself, as this paper demonstrates, there are fundamental 
issues which need consideration. This suggests that the participatory action research process 
deserves as much attention as the product itself. This study illustrates that the participatory action 
research process, although it can be a messy and emotional (Cahill, 2007), effort should build 
consensus on the nature, extent and effects of the problem using tools such as a problem tree 
analysis, stakeholder analysis and planning matrices for developing action plans to address the 
problem. The issues that were addressed by this study appear to be manifestations of tensions in 
the natural resources management literature which has had an influence on the legal, policy and 
institutional frameworks. Also, there are issues which are manifest in the geopolitical construction 
of the Zambezi Valley, where the Tonga people are portrayed as backward and primitive people 
(Manyena, 2013), which could have had implications in the way the fishermen were treated by 
government officials, particularly those who hailed from outside the Zambezi Valley. A wide view 
of issues sets in motion the strategies of solving problems, although that may not necessarily 
guarantee the success of participatory action research in bringing about social change. 
 
The Participatory Action Research Process 
The marginalization of the Kariba Dam fishermen should be viewed as a symptom of 
tensions in the natural resources management debate, particularly around Hardin’s (1968) 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’ theory. Since the creation of Lake Kariba, both colonial and post-
colonial governments on the Zimbabwean side of the Zambezi River have restricted access to 
International Journal of African Development v.3 n.2 Spring 2016  19 
 
fishing resources over concerns of overexploitation of fish stocks. However, Kolding (2003) 
disputes that there is overexploitation of fish stocks as inshore fishery stocks are said to be only 
moderately exploited and underutilized in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government has justified 
the use of strict regulatory mechanisms on the basis of Hardin’s (1968) ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ 
theory where it is argued that in the absence of any control mechanism, common or open access 
to a productive resource, like fish, leads to its overexploitation. This is despite some empirical 
evidence suggesting that some forests, rangelands and fishing areas which are neither state 
property nor private property have persisted for decades and even centuries (Gilles and Jamtgaard, 
1982; Sandford, 1983; Ostrom, 1990; Moxnes, 2000; Rogers, 2010). As a result of adopting a 
conservation and bio-centric ‘fish first-fisher last’ rather than ‘fisher-first fish last’ resource 
management regimen, the fishermen have been presented by government authorities as criminals, 
irresponsible, unreasonable and irrational beings who deserve punishment should they fail to 
conform to and comply with the rules. Yet, the opposite might be true: it is the state that has 
displayed some irrationality and arrogance towards its people; it has transformed a previously 
complex integrated knowledge system of resource management that supported the livelihoods of 
the Tonga people to the existing dysfunctional assemblage of fragmented systems (Mhlanga, 
2009). This perhaps calls for more research that involves fishermen as co-researchers so they can 
challenge some of the assumptions of the studies. 
Notwithstanding, the argument that the natural resources management is riddled with 
contestations, which can misinform policy and practice in certain situations, can provide a solid 
foundation for a sustainable resource management regimen. Here the marginalization of fishermen, 
as this study demonstrates, may be a failure by technocrats to interpret the natural resource 
management regulations. In some ways, the conflict between fishermen and state authorities, for 
example, on the fishing licensing system and unjustified criminalization and abuse of fishermen 
by law enforcement agents, could point to limited understanding of the fishery regulations by both 
the technocrats and the fishermen themselves. In this study, dialogue during meetings such as the 
participatory review of the National Parks and Wildlife Act involving stakeholders together with 
fishermen, provided an opportunity for them to build consensus on key barriers towards improved 
access and benefit-sharing of fishing resources along the Kariba Dam. This was important for 
another reason. The review of the legal instruments helped the stakeholders refine the issues that 
needed to be changed. Equipping fishermen and their stakeholders with knowledge and legal 
information on the natural resource management system fostered some level of confidence in a 
manner where they would advocate for socially just access and benefit-sharing arrangements of 
fishing resources.   
Moreover, considering the geopolitical implication that the Tonga people are backward and 
primitive built grassroots political work that would be durable and result in a sustainable and 
democratic fishermen’s organization, which was critical. Advocacy training provided the 
fishermen with skills for building political power to change society. Building a grassroots 
organization, social problem analysis, conflict management, social transformation, 
communication, dialogue, and lobbying were some of the skills that fishermen and stakeholders 
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received from the technical support team. These skills, it can be argued, could have reduced the 
inferiority complex and ‘fear of officials’ during the fishermen’s advocacy work, because the 
Tonga people tend to consider themselves inferior to other ethnic groups such as the Shona and 
Ndebele (Manyena, 2013).     
 
The Product of the Participatory Action Research Process 
Participatory action research that does not result in positive political change, particularly 
for those who have been systematically excluded, oppressed or denied by unjust social 
arrangements, could be considered a failure (Pain et al., 2007; Kindon et al., 2007). This paper 
demonstrates practical benefits of participatory action research. The implementation of the 
research findings by the fishermen and stakeholders brought positive change in the licensing 
system, suggesting that the access and benefit-sharing arrangement was leaning in favor of the 
fishermen. The government officials acknowledged the anomaly in the licensing system, and 
promised to rectify the situation.  
Also, the concerns regarding mistreatment and abuse of fishermen received attention from 
government officials, which had negative and unintended impacts that led to the reorganization of 
the National Parks offices. As a result, some government officials either lost their jobs or were 
transferred to locations outside the Zambezi Valley. Nonetheless, the results could be a 
demonstration that the fishermen’s concerns were taken seriously by government officials. 
However, underlying the actions taken by the fishermen to resolve issues around the fishing 
licensing and criminalization of fishermen appears to be that the political power of the fishermen 
was gradually being recognized by stakeholders. The formation of the Kujatana Kwesu Fisheries 
Union provided the fishermen with some leverage of political power and agency to present and 
represent themselves in ensuring a socially just system of accessing and benefit-sharing.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that tensions over improved access and benefit-sharing of fishing 
resources along the Kariba Dam are underpinned by the politics of marginalization of the Tonga. 
Thus, this study has shown the practical benefits of both the process and the product of 
participatory action research. Although the participatory action research process can be ‘messy,’ 
the findings appear to demonstrate that building consensus on issues that need resolving, as well 
as having the capacity to move key stakeholders into action, is critical. Importantly, this study also 
demonstrates the benefits of researchers and research-users to have collaborative power and 
agency to challenge the status quo while also widening the access and benefit-sharing arrangement 
options for the marginalized fishermen. The results of this study may resonate not only with 
challenges facing marginalized fishermen elsewhere, but they may be applicable to access and 
benefit-sharing issues more widely.    
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